As the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) gets down to revisiting the prices of stents and discussing their makers’ grievances in February, here are five reasons why multinational stent companies selling relatively high-end products can still hope. Continue reading “Stent price control: 5 reasons why ‘high-end stent’ companies might still hope”
The offer by needle and syringe manufacturers to voluntarily cap trade margins at 75 per cent after meeting with the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority apparently validates the view that without the actionable threat of price control, the healthcare sector cannot be trusted to self-regulate.
“The NPPA advised manufacturers to consider regulating price themselves; otherwise, the government would be forced to take steps as they have done to cap prices in the past for items like stents and orthopaedic implants,” reported the newspaper Mint quoting a person aware of the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity.
I asked, Rajiv Nath, President, AISNMA, the association of homegrown manufacturers that made this offer, in an e-mail : why wait for an NPPA ultimatum? If a cap was implementable, why not just go ahead and do it? I have published responses to these and other queries in their entirety in the interest of clarity. But before that, my take based on these responses and the media coverage on the issue. Continue reading “Is self-regulation in #medtech doomed to fail?”
The abnormally high margin that trade channels are believed to earn on a relatively small portion of the Indian pharmaceutical market has become the latest painpoint for the central government. The margins in question even cross 1000 per cent in some cases, according to a new report by a committee set up by the Department of Pharmaceuticals (DoP) in the Union Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers to investigate the matter.
The committee has now recommended capping trade margins on not just such meds which go by the moniker of ‘trade generics,’ but all drugs.
A cap on trade margins is not only difficult to implement but will do precious little to lower the price that the consumer pays. It might even lead to disputes and litigation between companies, trade, and the government. Besides, trade generics constitute not more than 15 per cent of the overall pharmaceutical market – and that is an outside estimate. Yet, this is being done in the name of the consumer. Continue reading “Why the government wants to cap trade margins on drugs and why it shouldn’t”
The holiday season approaches, so here’s a quick look at the year that was for Indian Pharma, before we disappear into a haze of year-end festivities. It’s a mixed bag (what year isn’t?) including stuff that could influence the way things work in the years ahead. For convenience, I’ve divided up what I think are key developments into posts rather than stick to any specific chronology of events. The first post was on the regulation of Indian manufacturing and the second on clinical trials and pharmacovigilance. This one is about drug pricing. Continue reading “India #Pharma 2014 : A quick look back. Part Three #pricing #nppa”
The latest round of price interventions imposed on the drug industry by India’s National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) has the industry fulminating. Just when it was recovering from being all but snubbed in the Union Budget, it finds that the NPPA has quietly pulled the rug from under its feet leaving it sprawled on the floor.
After the initial shock, industry captains have probably dusted themselves off and regrouped to figure out if they can sue the NPPA to oblivion. In their position, I would. Continue reading “Indian #pharma policy : Missing the wood for the trees”
On December 7, India’s National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy 2012 was finally tabled in Parliament. Assuming that this policy does get rolled out irrespective of a Supreme Court hearing on drug pricing playing out in parallel, the cornerstone of the policy i.e.data may create some vexing issues. Continue reading “India’s new drug pricing policy : will data be the stumbling block?”
Abbott’s acquisition of Piramal’s Indian branded drugs unit has raised the spectre of rising prices in some quarters. The reasons are two-fold : one, Abbott will pay Rs 17,000 crore for a Rs 2000 crore business and the need to earn a decent return on this will make it raise drug prices. And two, Abbott now has 7 per cent of the Indian market and is in number one position. Ergo, it is in a position of strength from where it can get away with price hikes.
Perhaps, Abbott will find the need to raise prices. But I believe it will find it difficult to do so across-the-board beyond a reasonable extent. For two reasons. One, what it has acquired are branded generics. This business has multiple copycats already on the market and nothing – at least, in the law – prevents more from joining the party. So, it is competitive. Two, the Piramal unit’s growth has also been driven by the opening up of ‘bottom-of-the-pyramid’ type markets that hitherto were under-served by companies. For instance, Dharavi (Asia’s largest slum) in Mumbai. These are extremely price-sensitive. So there will have to be a trade-off between profit and growth which defeats the purpose of the acquisition which is primarily for market share. And three, while a good number of drugs are outside government price control, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority reserves the right to fix prices under a public interest clause if they are raised by more than 10 per cent in a year. Indeed, Piramal and a good number of other companies fell afoul of this law not too long ago and saw some drug prices fixed by the government in spite of these drugs falling outside the purview of drug price control. This also meant that companies could not change prices of these brands again with consulting the drug price regulator.
True, Abbott may launch its patented drugs at a hefty premium but that it is already doing anyway. The concerns of rising drug prices in the context of the Abbott-Piramal deal, to my mind, are overdone.